








Extending animal welfare science to include wild animals 
 




Ng’s (2016) target article built on his earlier work advocating a science of welfare 
biology (Ng 1995). Although there were problems with the models proposed in Ng’s 
original paper regarding the balance of pleasure and suffering for wild animals, his 
call for a science of wild animal welfare was a sound one. This does not require a 
new discipline but just an extension of the existing frameworks and methods of 
animal welfare science to include wild animals. 
 
 
In a 1995 paper with the title “Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal 
consciousness and suffering”, the Malaysian-Australian welfare economist Yew-Kwang Ng advocated 
the creation of an interdisciplinary field of “welfare biology” that he defined as the “study of living 
things and their environment with respect to their welfare (defined as net happiness, or enjoyment 
minus suffering)” (p. 255). He aimed to address three questions with this field. (1) Which species are 
sentient? (2) Do their positive experiences outweigh their negative ones? (3) How can their welfare be 
improved? These three questions are obviously central to Animal Sentience. They are also appealing to 
any broadly utilitarian thinker; like Ng, we endorse a subjective Benthamite view of welfare as a balance 
of pleasure and pain (Browning 2019; Veit 2021). 
Although these three questions were obviously worth investigating, Ng’s proposals have 
received almost no attention from scientists. In contrast, philosophers, ethicists, and animal activists 
have promoted Ng’s idea fervently in recent years (e.g., Horta 2010; Tomasik 2015; Johannsen 2020; 
Soryl et al. 2021) because they perceived a neglect of wild animals in animal welfare science. The latter 
has historically focused on animals in captivity, especially in farms, and on developing adequate ways 
to measure animal welfare under captive conditions.  
One might get the impression from this that few animal welfare scientists, economists, and 
biologists (e.g., Beausoleil et al. 2018; Beausoleil 2020; Harvey et al. 2020) have been interested in wild 
animal welfare, but we think some of the omissions in Ng’s original 1995 paper might also have been 
an important reason. The paper contained no empirical data and no serious engagement with the work 
of animal welfare scientists. It proposed a speculative and intuition-driven model of wild animal 
welfare, combining evolutionary biology, economics, and population dynamics, to establish what Ng 
called the “Buddhist Premise” that the balance between suffering and pleasure for wild animals would 
tilt towards suffering. This presumption of the dominance of suffering in nature was then taken up by 
other writers in wild animal ethics (e.g. Horta 2010; Tomasik 2015) and led to some quite radical 
proposals (e.g., about putative moral benefits of habitat destruction; Tomasik 2017). Although Groff 
and Ng (2019) went on to report errors in the original that countered their Buddhist Premise, the 
original assumption can still be found in the wild animal ethics and welfare literature. 
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Ng’s (2016) target article, rather than updating his older proposal, proposed some cost-
effective and pragmatic ways to improve animal welfare. Ng suggested that we should first focus on 
the welfare of farmed animals and leave the question of wild animal welfare for the future. This is at 
variance with the way his original call for a science of welfare biology has been taken up by some 
animal advocates (Soryl et al. 2021). Ng’s reasons were largely pragmatic: it would be easier to win 
people over to improving farmed welfare because (1) we are the ones causing their suffering, (2) we 
know less about wild animals, (3) we cannot intervene as directly in their lives, and (4) our interventions 
in natural ecosystems could have unforeseeable negative repercussions.  
Although some commentators uncharitably implied that his interest might focus on farmed 
animals because they are useful to us, we agree with much of Ng’s pragmatic reasoning. Even in a 
utilitarian framework that treats the welfare of all species equally, it could be considered reasonable to 
postpone the question of wild animal welfare for the future, when we know more and when concern 
for farmed animals has gained a broader social consensus. Unfortunately, few commentators endorsed 
this pragmatic position. One notable exception was the philosopher Kyle Johannsen (2016), who 
concluded his commentary with approbation: “Ng should be commended for his progressive and yet 
cautious stance towards suffering in the wild, a topic that has only recently begun to attract much 
philosophical attention.” Five years later, however, things have changed a lot. Wild animal welfare is 
now widely discussed by philosophers, ethicists, animal advocates, and policy-makers, with some of 
the discussion funded by private non-profit organizations dedicated to animal welfare (Soryl et al. 
2021). The science of wild animal welfare once again calls for careful consideration. 
The models that were initially proposed for wild animal welfare were highly speculative; but 
the Darwinian idea of welfare as a natural phenomenon in its evolved context seems useful and worthy 
of pursuit. In 1998 Marian Dawkins had noted that “animal welfare studies generally lacked the 
evolutionary framework that characterizes so much else in biology” (p. 305). Soryl et al. propose a 
welfare biology that moves beyond Ng’s treatment to address the “problem of widespread wild animal 
suffering.” They provide no specific empirical framework or method, however. Yet that is what would 
be needed to create an evolutionarily and ecologically motivated science of animal welfare no longer 
confined to animals in captivity. 
Animal welfare science can be readily extended to include wild animals. Yet none of the 
seventeen commentators on Ng were welfare scientists. The points Ng makes are well known in that 
field. Most practitioners, for example, now accept that the subjective experience of animals – i.e., 
animal sentience – is a valid object of scientific investigation (Mellor et al. 2020; Yeates and Main 2008; 
Duncan 2002).  
The distinction between captivity and freedom is often overstated; there is no intrinsic 
difference between wild and captive animals (Browning and Veit 2021). We should focus on how to 
extend the current methods of welfare science to measure, assess, and improve animal welfare in the 
wild. This is not to deny that new methods are needed for assessing the welfare of animals outside 
captivity. More evolutionary and ecological considerations should be integrated into the science of 
animal welfare (Veit and Browning 2020). Anecdotal evidence from ethologists and ecologists 
studying animals in the wild may be a useful starting point (Browning 2017). There may well be 
reciprocity too: The knowledge gained from welfare assessment in the wild may also be adaptable to 
animals in captivity. In looking to study the welfare of wild animals, we should engage the existing 
frameworks and methods of animal welfare science, as there is much we can take from them, and their 
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